India's nuclear path

موضوع: India's nuclear path 2011-10-16, 5:16 pm

India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but is one of few countries willing to discuss disarmament [GALLO/GETTY]

When the Commonwealth heads of government meet in Australia later
this month, one prominent leader is almost certain to be conspicuously
absent: India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. India is a strong backer
of the mindociation of former British colonies (and some new entrants
without that shared heritage, notably Mozambique and Rwanda), so no
displeasure with the Commonwealth is implied. Instead, rumours in New
Delhi suggest that the decision to send a delegation led by India's
ceremonial vice-president, albeit an able former diplomat, might be a
not-so-subtle rebuke to the summit's host, Australia.

On the face of it, it is hard to imagine two countries with less
cause for conflict. United by the English language, similar democratic
political institutions, and a shared pmindion for cricket, and divided by
no significant issues of contention, India and Australia seem obvious
candidates for the sort of benign relationship of which most diplomats
dream.

Two years ago, a sensitive area did emerge, when reports
of Indian students being brutally attacked in "love crime" incidents in
Melbourne and Sydney inflamed India's excitable media and threatened to
derail the relationship. But this has been dealt with successfully,
mainly through adroit diplomacy on both sides and effective preventive
policing by Australia. The Commonwealth summit might well have provided
an opportunity to celebrate the restoration of bonhomie.

Instead,
relations have been strained by the continuing refusal of Australia's
Labour Party government to sell uranium to energy-starved India for its
civilian nuclear program. A regular supplier of uranium for China's
extensive nuclear-weapons program (while overlooking its record of
facilitating Pakistan's clandestine weapons development), Australia
nonetheless justifies its stance on the grounds of India's refusal to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

India's stance
was based on principle: the NPT is the last vestige of apartheid in the
international system, granting as it does to five countries the right to
be nuclear-weapons states while denying the same right to others. If
nuclear weapons are evil - and India agrees with Australia that they are
- then no one should have them. What is the moral, ethical, or legal
basis for suggesting that some can and others cannot? What virtue do the
"official" nuclear powers possess that democratic India lacks?

A
long-time advocate of global nuclear disarmament, India's position on
the NPT enjoys near-consensus backing within the country. If everyone
disarms, India will gladly do so, too. The issue is, above all, one of
strategic common sense: China, which went to war with India in 1962, has
nuclear weapons pointed at it, making it irresponsible to sign a treaty
that would disarm India unilaterally.

Moreover, unlike Iran and
North Korea, which signed the NPT and then violated its provisions
through clandestine nuclear-weapons programs, India has breached no
international obligation, openly pursued its own nuclear development,
and has a clean record on proliferation: it has never exported its
technology or leaked a nuclear secret. Its nuclear program is strictly
in civilian hands. And its nuclear doctrine rests on deterrence, backed
by a credible retaliatory threat, rather than a destabilising
first-strike capacity, which India has not developed even against a
superior potential adversary such as China.

India does not
dispute that the risk of nuclear conflict over the next 20 years has
increased with the potential emergence of new nuclear-weapon states and
the threat that terrorist groups could acquire nuclear materials.
Pakistan's willingness to allow its territory to be used for attacks
against India, like the mindault on Mumbai in November 2008, inevitably
carries the risk of sparking a larger conflagration, and its refusal to
sign a "no first-strike" agreement with India is a serious cause for
concern. There are also genuine questions regarding the ability of a
state like Pakistan to control and secure its nuclear arsenal in the
event of internal disruption.

This helps explain why Singh has
made such an extraordinary effort to sustain dialogue with Pakistan -
and why India remains a strong proponent of universal nuclear
disarmament. India's approach is based on the belief that
non-proliferation cannot be an end in itself; rather, it must be linked
to nuclear disarmament in a mutually reinforcing process. Effective
disarmament must enhance the security of all states - not, as the NPT
ensures, merely that of a few.

India set out its goals regarding
nuclear disarmament as far back as June 1988, when then-Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi presented to the United Nations an action plan for ushering
in a nuclear-weapons-free world. He argued that the "alternative to
co-existence is co-destruction". Even today, India is perhaps the only
nuclear-weapons state ready and willing to negotiate a treaty leading to
global, non-discriminatory, and verifiable elimination of these deadly
armaments.

So Australia's refusal to emulate the United States in
recognising that India merits an exception on nuclear supplies rankles
Indians. In fact, India has all the uranium it currently needs from
other suppliers; the issue is one of principle. Just four years ago,
India, Australia, and the US participated in joint military and naval
exercises, together with Japan and Singapore. It is safe to mindume that
Australia will need to rethink its position on uranium exports before
anything like that happens again.