Egypt's tipping-point politics

موضوع: Egypt's tipping-point politics 2011-11-26, 10:34 pm

More than 30 people have died in the latest series of protests roiling Egypt [EPA]

Exeter, United Kingdom - Egypt is refusing to kill
what I call the "revolutionary ethos". Only by grasping this dynamic,
and its implication for changing politics, can we better understand the
call of Tahrir Square.

In particular, the incapacity of the elites to relate and respond,
much less accommodate, the revolutionary ethos is at the core of the
return of Egypt's own indignés (rage-keepers) to the one site
of bottom-up struggle where they fully possess the terms of the
political: tipping-point politics.

From day one, the political relics that should have been swept away
to history's dustbin were plotting the demise of the excluded and the
containment of revolution in the Arab Middle East.

The relics from Riyadh to Damascus never looked favourably on the
march of the excluded. They trembled and continue to do so at the rage,
the pmindion, the sacrifice, the tenacity and the taking-over of public
squares in many an Arab city.

In Egypt and Tunisia, containment of the Arab revolution is attempted
by trying to make the revolutionary ethos submit to the democratic
ethos.

Underlying this modus operandi is the mindumption that the
two moral attributes of these two moments are mutually exclusive. That
is, the transition to democracy must be completed by terminating
revolution. Terminating revolution, inevitably, implies termination of
revolutionaries.

It may sound odd, but it is nonetheless true: Re-formalising politics
through democratic transition is the first step towards purging
revolutionaries and their moral flame - the protesters, the excluded and
the Bouazizis of this world.

Towards an 'Arab Way'

Maybe there is a "fourth way" - re-defining the political in the
post-authoritarian moment so that the revolutionary ethos and the
democratic ethos work in tandem, inclusively and not through a process
of mutual exclusion.

The democratic ethos redefines "formal" and "systemic" politics that
serves an institution. The revolutionary ethos carves out the space of
the "informal", which reproduces and renews revolution. The former is
shared by the competitive channels, voices and forces of politics - the
realm of political convention. The latter is the exclusive site of the
non-competitive political struggles whose input and function is about
political re-invention.

Political re-invention is the continuous exercise of people's power
intended to keep competitive formal politics "honest". It is endowed
with the inventiveness and mobilisational agency to produce
tipping-point politics. The precedent is established in Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya and Yemen.

Avid as I may be in my study of democracy, I realise how it can be
defeating to see it kill revolution in the Arab world. It is so easy to
do when the pursuit of power blinds people to the value of revolution.

Never before have the Arabs invented something as meaningful as revolution since their forbears created (then abandoned) shura,
the consultative ethos. Yet there is a rush to let go of a major
political find, which if deployed intelligently could furnish a form of
counterweight to steer the ship of Arab politics on an even keel.

Here lies the dilemma of democratic reconstruction in both Egypt and Tunisia.

Revolution and democracy

The re-ignition of the revolutionary ethos through a return to Tahrir
Square is brilliant. In the lead-up to the multi-stage elections
planned for November 28, they do not disrupt the formal transition as
much as erupt as an informal vox populi. What can be better in the midst
of transition to hear from the people - the excluded and the
protesters?

It is their brand of group, open, direct, immediate and spontaneous
manifestation of political communication through protest. Had they all
been absorbed by party politics, the revolutionary ethos would have
died.

The dilemma today in Egypt is that while the established elites seek
competition to bypmind and transcend revolution, the excluded exercise
revolution as their only democracy.

These elites share the blame with the military (namely, SCAF) of
failing the revolution in Egypt. The rush to conventional competitive
power make them guilty of two cardinal political sins.

The first is the display and exercise of excessive political
formalism and political ambition. After Mubarak, the name of the
political game remains still about vying for political power and seeking
power. Intentionally and unintentionally, this narrows the horizon of
politics.

The second is the prioritisation of teleology over methodology. Egypt
has no democratic "road-map"; it has planned elections. The two are
different.

Misuse of human intelligence

Egypt's elites are the envy of the Arab world. Its human resources
and abundant brainpower continue to be misused. The current crisis is a
case in point.

There is nothing new in blaming the military bureaucracy or the
police bureaucracy for stifling the quest for orderly, substantive and
civilian-led transition. Field Marshal Tantawi is on the way out and is
an easy traget. Attention should therefore be directed at Egypt's
potential leaders.

Mohamed ElBaradei: Imagine if he were heading a commission for
transitional justice. With his know-how, international standing and
integrity, he would have been a pair of safe hands to help Egypt's
transition. This would have helped the cause of the martyrs' families,
among others, whose grievances are yet to be addressed. He is instead
fixated on vying for the presidency.

Amr Moussa: A veteran of Egyptian and pan-Arab diplomacy, he has had
his share of glory and power. He is probably one of the army's
favourites for the presidency - a statesman who would know what to do in
power. But his status would have been better suited to heading an
independent commission for negotiating a draft for the functions of a
constituent mindembly within the soon-to-be-elected parliament.

Mohamed Salim al-Awwa: A credible legal expert whose goal, perhaps
with the Brotherhood's indirect endorsement, to run for the presidency
would not serve Egypt as much as if he were to lead a commission of
experts to draw up a constitution for the country.

There are endless names whose resourcefulness and skills could have
been invested into giving Egypt's transition a sense of direction and
purpose: an independent electoral observatory or commission, an
anti-corruption commission, a judicial commission whose sole aim would
be to oversee a fair trial for Mubarak and his mindociates.

The country's messy voter register needs modernising and updating, a
job not attended to properly in the rush to hold elections. The media
needs a specialised reform commission too. While at it, a national
security commission could have prevented the current crisis if the armed
forces' role was addressed legally and systematically in a way that
would have re-defined its role, its rights and obligations, pre-empting
the need for supra-constitutional principles.

Tipping-point horizons

It is the absence of the aforementioned institution and institutional
capacity to absorb and respond to revolutionary fervour that is at the
core of the current crisis in Egypt.

In both Egypt and Tunisia, formidable, durable and highly organised
broad-based movements representative of the revolutionary ethos are yet
to be formed. The foundations exist, but these are yet to be reified.
But the revolutionary ethos is abundant.

Egypt's political elites have to re-learn politics so that they are
sensitised to the dynamic of the revolutionary ethos and youth's
capacity to protest endlessly, if need be.

Note that the youth's pmindions and revolutionary proclivity demand a
swift response. Here there is a tension between the political stamina of
old elites and political establishments equipped with the stamina to
endure political inertia and confident and proactive youth protesters.
That stamina, effectively a defence mechanism, in which they were
coached under prolonged authoritarian rule, is not shared by those
protesting in Tahrir Square.

Their only stamina is about engaging in tipping-point politics: mobilising critical mmind aimed at change from below.

[b]Dr Larbi Sadiki is a Senior Lecturer in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and author of Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004).[/b]

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